In her reply to my (2003) discussion of her (2003a) case of patient J., Weisel-Barth (2003b) offers the judgment that my philosophical understandings "distract and contract" me and "lure [me] away from [my] . . . strengths as an imaginative clinician" (p. 231). In fact, I have been interested in the philosophical undergirdings of psychoanalysis since I was a graduate student in clinical psychology during the mid-1960s, so much so that I looked into the possibility of concurrently enrolling in a doctoral program in philosophy at that time. I ended up pursuing psychoanalytic training instead, but my interest in the interface between psychoanalysis and philosophy has persisted unabatedly ever since (Stolorow, Atwood, & Orange, 2002). So, would Weisel-Barth contend that such philosophical interests have restricted my clinical abilities for the past four decades? Such a claim would fly in the face of innumerable experiences in which I have noted that philosophical understanding and awareness of the philosophical assumptions that underpin clinical work actually enhance and expand one's clinical sensibility. Perhaps, then, Weisel-Barth means to contend that a deterioration of my clinical capacities has only become evident more recently, as when I offered a critique of the philosophical assumptions implicit in her clinical presentation.

Toward the end of her reply, Weisel-Barth (2003b) seems to justify her distaste for philosophical questioning, at least in part, on the basis of gender differences (p. 237). Perhaps she is unaware that the two philosophers - Marcia Cavell (1993) and Donna Orange (1995) - who, during the past decade, have made the most valuable applications of philosophical understanding to psychoanalytic theory and practice are both female.

REFERENCES

Cavell, M. (1993). The Psychoanalytic Mind: From Freud to Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Orange, D. M. (1995). Emotional Understanding: Studies in Psychoanalytic Epistemology. New York: Guilford Press.

Stolorow, R. D. (2003). "On the impossibility of immaculate perception - there is no relationship without interpretation, and there is no interpretation without relationship". In: Explorations in Self Psychology: Progress in Self Psychology, Vol. 19, ed. M. Gehrie. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press, pp. 217-223.

--- Atwood, G. E., & Orange, D. M. (2002). Worlds of Experience: Interweaving Philosophical and Clinical Dimensions in Psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books.

Weisel-Barth, J. (2003a). "The case of patient J". In: Explorations in Self Psychology: Progress in Self Psychology, Vol. 19, ed. M. Gehrie. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press, pp. 199-206.

--- (2003b). "Reply to the discussions". In: Explorations in Self Psychology: Progress in Self Psychology, Vol. 19, ed. M. Gehrie. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press, pp. 225-243.